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361 
FAMILY CLASSES: RETHINKING 
CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE 
Naomi Cahn & June Carbone
* 
 
I suggest that, apart from the muted story of racism, implications of 
social class have been neglected in the legal literature on abortion and 
divorce . . . . In essence, we witness in the United States a raging battle 
within limited segments of the middle classes on how to regulate the 
consequences of sexual conduct of everybody else. The American lower 
classes and large parts of the lower-middle class have no voice or no 
opinion, and the upper class is unconcerned.
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each of us teaches family law, which provides an opportunity to 
reflect on the differing meanings of families and class. A rich, 
controversial, and storied literature addresses the intersections of race, 
gender, class, and family.
2
 Anthropology once also devoted 
considerable attention to working-class life, including differences in 
family formation. Over the last fifty years, however, explicit attention to 
family and class has only sporadically appeared in legal and policy 
discourse. Initially it was overshadowed by discussions of race and 
family, especially in the wake of the controversial Moynihan Report of 
the sixties, and the effective disappearance of marriage in poor African-
American communities.
3
 In the eighties and nineties, it briefly 
resurfaced as part of the discussion of welfare reform, and Charles 
Murray‟s efforts to sound the alarm about “The Coming White 
                                                                                                                     
* Naomi Cahn, John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, George Washington 
University Law School. June Carbone, the Edward A. Smith/Missouri Chair of Law, 
Constitution and Society, UMKC School of Law. This Article is based on Naomi Cahn‟s 
Weyrauch Distinguished Lecture, delivered March 23, 2009, at the University of Florida, Levin 
College of Law, and Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families: Legal 
Polarization and the Creation of Culture (2010). Our thanks to Nancy Dowd, Shani King, Nancy 
Levit, and Barbara Woodhouse. 
 1.  Walter O. Weyrauch, Family Law Book Review, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 832, 836 (1989) 
(reviewing MARY A. GLENDON, HERMENEUTICS, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, A REVIEW OF 
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)). 
 2.  A comprehensive list would be vast. On race, see, for example, ORLANDO 
PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN TWO AMERICAN CENTURIES 
(1999); on class, see JOAN WILLIAMS, CLASS ACTS AND GENDER WORKS: RESHAPING THE 
EVERYDAY AND ELECTORAL POLITICS OF WORK AND FAMILY (forthcoming 2010).  
 3.  See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 2. 
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Underclass.”4 More recently, however, the moral values discussion and 
its role in the ideological divisions between the left and right have 
overshadowed the importance of class in explaining changes in family 
dynamics. 
The political attention paid to moral values—in the context of the 
high profile fights over abortion, homosexuality, and abstinence 
education—has developed over the past quarter century in ideological 
terms as though race and class no longer existed. In fact, the changing 
understandings that attend family formation reflect a long term shift in 
the pathways to middle class life creating a new technocratic elite—an 
elite that invests heavily in both men and women‟s advanced degrees, 
and has remade family life to its advantage. The success of the new 
model, which we call the “blue family paradigm,” and the sexual 
revolution at its core undermines what had once been consensus support 
for traditional values (which we will call “the red family paradigm”), 
and for the structure of family life following from abstinence to 
courtship to marriage.
5
 
The result of the tensions between these family ideals has been a 
moral backlash. To be sure, the leaders of the political backlash 
represent a different elite—one dominated by the more conservative, 
more business-oriented and more religious Republicans in the South and 
Midwest. As political scientist Andrew Gelman emphasizes in Red 
State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State, political differences are greater 
among people with higher incomes, and religious attendance better 
predicts political differences of the rich than of the poor.
6
 If we consider 
only high income elites, then the divide on social issues between the 
well-educated, secular elites who dominate Democratic areas of the 
country, and the more religious, high income voters who dominate 
Republican areas of the country is more pronounced than the political 
differences between poorer voters on the issues underlying the culture 
wars.
7
 
While these political leaders and activists frame the issues (and do so 
without much reference to race and class), the dispute nonetheless 
reflects three significant class dimensions, which we will highlight in 
this Article. First, the communities “on the cusp” of this family 
transformation are what in another era we might have recognized as the 
                                                                                                                     
 4.  Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at A14; 
see generally CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 
(1984).  
 5.  We set out these paradigms more fully in RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES (2010). 
 6.  ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE: WHY 
AMERICANS VOTE THE WAY THEY DO 92-93 (2008). 
 7.  Id. 
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white working class. This group, which has income levels well above 
the poverty line, but lower levels of education than the more 
comfortable middle class, sees the foundation of its marriage-based 
family life under assault. Divorce rates for these communities have 
plateaued near their historic highs, and nonmarital birth rates have 
grown, particularly for the 20-24 year-old age group ready to begin 
family life. Social conservatives are genuinely concerned about what 
they see as the moral decay of their communities, and resent the 
celebration of more open and tolerant attitudes toward sexuality that 
undermine (and sometimes denigrate) their efforts to instill age old 
values in their children.  
The second overlooked class dimension in these struggles, however, 
is the opposite of the first. Efforts to stem the “moral decay” in these 
more traditional communities, which often have taken the form of high 
profile efforts to promote abstinence in public schools and to harass and 
obstruct abortion clinics, may make family-based inequality even worse 
for poorer families. In the poorest communities, marriage has already 
disappeared for all intents and purposes, and moral suasion alone cannot 
bring it back. “Moral responses,” such as abstinence-only education and 
lesser access to contraception and abortion, disproportionately affect 
those without the resources to circumvent the new strictures and 
produce more unwanted births in the process—exacerbating growing 
inequality, which determines the circumstances of the next generation.  
The third dimension is the change in the distribution of overall 
fertility. Many American commentators celebrate the fact that overall 
U.S. fertility remains above the replacement rate and well ahead of 
fertility in Europe and Japan. The high overall rates, however, which 
most pundits acknowledge reflect Latino immigration to the United 
States, also occur because of much higher rates of unintended 
pregnancy than in most of the rest of the developed world. If we were to 
acknowledge the unintended pregnancy rate, we might also have to 
acknowledge that the “blue” regions of the country in fact have fertility 
levels that approach those of Northern Europe, and that an uncritical 
embrace of delayed childbearing would produce much higher rates of 
involuntary childlessness. 
In this Article, we highlight the tensions between the two family 
models, describe the backlash these tensions have produced, and 
critique the class-based nature of the results. We argue that the 
politicization of family issues has produced its own “vicious cycle” of 
moral concern, draconian changes that disproportionately affect the 
poorest and most vulnerable Americans, and a new round of moral 
panic justifying further punitive measures, as the initial restrictions 
(such as closing abortion clinics and slashing family planning funds) 
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make matters worse. We conclude that the “culture wars” are very much 
about class, and yet they are framed exactly as Professor Weyrauch 
reported: a fight between two relatively privileged groups, in which 
class implications of the struggle disappear from sight. This Article 
argues that only by making these class implications visible—for low 
income, middle class, and wealthy individuals—can we design more 
effective interventions that can break the cycle.  
II. FAMILY FORMATION IN BLUE AND RED 
 
Family has become a marker of class in American life, exacerbating 
economic inequality. The children of well-educated parents 
overwhelmingly grow up in two-parent, two-income families with 
substantially greater material and emotional resources than those 
available to the single-parent families that have come to dominate 
poorer communities.
8
 Within working-class families, the level of 
education necessary to achieve middle class status is becoming 
increasingly difficult to obtain, exacerbated by economic difficulties 
made worse by family instability. As Harvard economists Claudia 
Goldin and Lawrence Katz point out,  
 
recent wage structure changes have been associated with a 
“polarization” of the U.S. labor market with employment 
shifting into high-and low-wage jobs at the expense of 
middle-wage positions. . . . [T]he majority of the increase 
in wage inequality since 1980 has come from rising 
educational wage differentials, particularly rising returns to 
post-secondary schooling.”9  
 
The role of family structure in aggravating economic inequality 
starts with two overlapping changes in the American economy. First, 
the returns to higher education, and especially post-graduate degrees, 
are greater than ever, and those rewards are now available to both men 
and women. Second, greater global economic competition has driven 
the high paid manufacturing jobs available to less educated men 
                                                                                                                     
 8.  Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Fare Under the Second 
Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 608, 614-15 (2004). 
 9.  See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE KATZ, LONG-RUN CHANGES IN THE U.S, WAGE 
STRUCTURE: NARROWING, WIDENING, POLARIZING 2 (2007), http://www3. 
brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/forum/200709goldin_katz.pdf [hereinafter 
GOLDIN & KATZ, LONG-RUN CHANGES]. 
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overseas. As Goldin and Katz observe, the middle in the American 
market has diminished, leaving relatively low-paying service jobs where 
pay has stagnated, but increasing the demand for highly educated and 
skilled workers.
10
  
The middle class responded to these changes by investing more in 
their children, and doing so for both men and women. During the 
sixties, overall college attendance grew. From 1960 to 1970, the rise in 
the number of college students “was nothing short of phenomenal,” with 
enrollment more than doubling from 3.8 million to 8.5 million, an 
increase of over 100%, and increasing by another 41% in the 
seventies.
11
 Women‟s attendance grew faster than men‟s, rising from 
1.3 million in 1960 to more than 3 million in 1970.
12
 By 1980, women 
constituted more than half of all undergraduates.
13
 In 2003, 30.9% of 
the women aged 25 to 29 in the United States were college graduates 
compared to 26% of men.
14
  
The rise in women‟s educational attainment and career ambitions 
would have been difficult to reconcile with the family formation 
patterns of the fifties, where the average age of marriage for the country 
as a whole dropped to twenty, fueled in part by an increase in the 
number of brides pregnant at the altar. Over the course of the next two 
decades, as the number of women attending college grew, the “sexual 
revolution” took hold, transforming the lives of women in their 
twenties, and changing middle class understandings about the 
foundation of family life.  
In this period, not only did the percentage of college graduates 
married by age twenty-three drop by 40%, but those married by age 26 
fell from more than 70% of those born in the mid-forties (the college 
graduates of the late sixties) to approximately half of those born in 
1960.
15
 The increase in the ranks of unmarried young adults occurred 
simultaneously with an increase in the sexual activity of younger 
women, a dramatic drop in teen births, and changing expectations about 
fertility. Economists Goldin and Katz observe that, using a variety of 
data samples from the era, the percentage of women who report 
                                                                                                                     
 10.  See id. at 8, 11; see also Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: 
Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 749 
[hereinafter Goldin & Katz, The Power of the Pill]. 
 11.  Russell W. Rumberger, The Job Market for College Graduates, 1960-1990, 55 J. 
HIGHER EDUC. 433, 436 (1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1981442.pdf. 
 12.  Id. at 437 tbl.1. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2003, at 4 (2004), http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-550.pdf. 
 15.  GOLDIN & KATZ, LONG-RUN CHANGES, supra note 9; Goldin & Katz, The Power of 
the Pill, supra note 10, at 751. 
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engaging in sex before the age of twenty-one grew from about 40% of 
those born in 1945 to more than 70% of those born a decade later.
16
 The 
number reporting sexual activity before the age of eighteen grew even 
more dramatically, from about 15% of those born in 1945 to more than 
40% of those born in 1955.
17
 In the sixties, half of the women who 
engaged in premarital sex did so only with their fiancés, yet by the mid-
eighties, less than 25% of the women who reported having pre-marital 
sex did so only with men they expected to marry.
18
 
Nonetheless, despite the increase in sexual activity, birth rates 
dropped. Whereas the teen birthrate crested in 1957 at 97 births per 
thousand girls between the ages of 15 and 19, by 1983 the rates fell 
almost in half to 52 births per thousand girls.
19
 Adoption rates between 
unrelated individuals also changed markedly. They peaked at all time 
highs in 1970, but dropped in half by 1975.
20
 During this same period, 
expectations about fertility changed. In 1963, 80% of non-Catholic 
female college students wanted three or more children, and 44% wanted 
at least four.
21
 By 1973, just 29% wanted three or more children (and 
the cohort had fewer children than even those lower numbers)—an 
extraordinary shift in a ten-year period.
22
  
These changes in the relationship between sex, marriage, and the 
transition to adulthood created what we have termed the “blue family 
paradigm.” With this new set of family values, emotional maturity and 
financial independence are the sine qua non of responsible family 
formation. In order to facilitate the investment in workforce potential of 
both men and women, it is critical to postpone family formation until 
education is complete and careers are established. Women‟s greater 
financial contributions to family income, in turn, require greater male 
socialization into more egalitarian and companionate relationships. 
Because marriage and childbearing are postponed until individuals are 
                                                                                                                     
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 753. 
 18.  KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 87-95 (1984). 
 19.  STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE 
NOSTALGIA TRAP 202-03 (1992); see also LUKER, supra note 18, at 196 tbl.1 (showing that 
teenage birthrates were 79.5 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1950, 91.0 births per 
thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1960, 73.3 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1965, 
69.7 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1970, and 59.9 births per thousand women 
aged 15 to 19 in 1990). 
 20.  Penelope L. Maza, Adoption Trends: 1944-1975, in CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH 
NOTES #9, at 1-4 (U.S. Children‟s Bureau 1984), available at http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/ 
~adoption/archive/MazaAT.htmChildWelfareResearchNotes#9. Washington, DC: Administra-
tion for Children, Youth, and Families (1984). 
 21.  Goldin & Katz, The Power of the Pill, supra note 10, at 752. 
 22.  Id. 
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in their late twenties and early thirties, fertility control is critical: 
abstinence is unrealistic because of the long gap between puberty and 
marriage, contraception is not only permissible, but morally compelled, 
and abortion is the responsible fallback.  
Those who have followed the new blue paradigm have profited 
handsomely. With later marriage there is less guesswork involved in 
picking a mate. We have a much better sense by the age of thirty than at 
twenty regarding who will be successful and who will not, who will 
outgrow teen partying and who will be an alcoholic, who will pursue 
career ambitions and who will give up, and who will acknowledge their 
attraction to same-sex partners. Goldin and Katz report that assortative 
mating has increased the effect—the well-educated marry the well-
educated, and benefit from two higher incomes.
23
 Moreover, while the 
educated hold more liberal attitudes generally, and while the “blue” 
areas of the country demonstrate more tolerance toward sexuality and a 
variety of family forms, the well-educated have remade the terms of 
family life to better support two-parent, married families than the rest of 
the population.
24
 
Thus, sociologist Sara McLanahan, drawing on studies by Steve 
Martin, emphasizes that the best-off quarter of America, defined by 
women‟s level of education, has increased the advantages for its 
children along every measurable outcome.
25
 For this group of families, 
divorce rates have fallen back to the level of the early sixties—before 
no-fault divorce, nonmarital birth rates are 7%, the same as in the mid-
sixties, fathers spend more time with their children while mothers spend 
no less (the women cut back on housework instead), and family income 
has increased appreciably while stagnating for everyone else.
26
  
The explanation McLanahan offers for these developments is the 
change in the age of marriage: for the best-educated quartile of 
American women, mothers‟ median age rose from 26 in 1970 to 32 in 
2000.
27
 For mothers in the bottom quartile, it remained relatively flat at 
22.
28
 For the middle group, it rose slightly from 24 to 26. The age of 
                                                                                                                     
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  McLanahan, supra note 8, at 608. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 609. 
 28.  Id. It should be noted, however, that fertility rates have also dropped, especially for 
teens. See Child Trends Data Bank, Percentage of Births to Unmarried Women, 
www.childtrendsdatabank.org/pdf/75_PDF.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2010). Between 1960 and 
2000, for example, births to 15 to 19 year old women fell by more than half. Id. The 
composition of the remaining births nonetheless varies by race and class. Id. White women, for 
example, have higher birth rates in every age group above twenty-five, while African Americans 
have higher birth rates in every cohort under twenty-five, even though both races report 
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childbearing is thus a marker of class, and for those who avoid early 
child-bearing, conventional families with two married parents and a 
high degree of stability follow to a remarkable degree with a minimum 
of external coercion.
29
 
This result has undermined the traditional routes to family life in two 
overlapping ways. First, for the poorest Americans, it has made 
marriage that much harder to come by, producing dramatically greater 
rates of nonmarital births.
30
 A lengthy literature debates the reason for 
the shift, but perhaps the most intriguing explanation involves 
bargaining theory and the decline of the “shot gun” marriage. 
Economists Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz observe that for traditionalists 
“courtship” used to involve an implied promise: if the woman got 
pregnant, the man married her.
31
 As women gained the ability to control 
their own fertility through use of the pill and access to abortion, the 
implied promise disappeared.
32
 For women who used family planning to 
avoid childbirth and for those women who did not want or were not 
ready for children (and, indeed, for those women who wanted sex on the 
same terms as men), these developments increased their range of 
choices.
33
 Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz emphasize, however, that the 
women most disadvantaged by these developments were those ready to 
start childbearing and unable to secure a promise to marry.
34
 The groups 
for whom this may have been most important are the white working 
class, where courtship was typically sexual, brief, and concentrated in 
the late teens, and poorer women ready to begin childbearing at younger 
ages more generally.  
Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz conclude that the advent of the birth 
control pill and abortion produced dramatic declines in the overall 
number of unintended births, but also produced a higher percentage of 
nonmarital births—and did so disproportionately for poorer women.35 
Today, 72% of African-American births are nonmarital, and the shot 
gun marriage, which was never as strong a tradition among African-
                                                                                                                     
substantial declines in teen childbearing. Id.  
 29.  For a summary of the benefits of later marriage and childbearing, see ELIZABETH 
GREGORY, READY: WHY WOMEN ARE EMBRACING THE NEW LATER MOTHERHOOD 8-10 (2007) 
(noting that women who give birth at 34 live onger with fewer health issues than women who 
give birth at any other age, and older women generally have more resources, and happier, more 
stable and more egalitarian marriages). 
 30.  George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United 
States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277, 279, 289-90, 291-96 (1996). 
 31.  See id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 279-82  
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Americans as among whites, is virtually non-existent.
36
 Nonmarital 
births increased more slowly for whites, but did so most dramatically 
for poorer whites.
37
 Charles Murray‟s cries of alarm about the “coming 
white underclass” documented the steep rise in the eighties for this 
population, rates that have resumed their climb.
38
 The states with the 
highest white teen birth rates vote Republican, and this may be, as 
Murray documented, a symbol of class anxiety.
39
 By 2006, the overall 
nonmarital birth rate for whites had reached 32%, well above the rate 
for African-Americans in the sixties that inspired the Moynihan 
Report.
40
 While an increasing number of well-off Americans also 
choose single parenthood today, those numbers are small in comparison 
with the number of poorer, unmarried women giving birth in their early 
twenties. 
The second factor affecting the results has been the increased 
riskiness of early marriage. Studies have long indicated that marriage 
before the bride turns twenty produces a dramatically greater risk of 
divorce.41 The most comprehensive modern data, by the government‟s 
Centers for Disease Control, showed that the greatest gains in marital 
stability occurred when the women‟s age at marriage increased from the 
late teens to the early twenties, while for cohabitants, stability was best 
achieved when the women began the relationship in her mid-twenties.
42
 
                                                                                                                     
 36.  For a summary of these developments, see DONNA L. FRANKLIN, ENSURING 
INEQUALITY: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILY (1997). 
 37.  See id. at 111. 
 38.  See Murray, supra note 4. 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2006, 57(7) NAT‟L VITAL STAT. REPS., 
Jan. 7, 2009, at 1, 11, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_07.pdf. 
 41. See, e.g., Alan Booth & John N. Edwards, Age at Marriage and Marital Instability, 47 
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 67, 68, 71 (1985) (summarizing literature and observing that age at 
marriage is the single best predictor of divorce). See generally Barbara D. Whitehead & David 
Popenoe, Essay, The Marrying Kind: Which Men Marry and Why, in THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 
2004: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 6,6 (Nat‟l Marriage Project ed., 2004), 
available at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/publications/SOOU/SOOU2004.pdf. Efforts to indicate 
why suggest that greater infidelity at younger ages is a significant factor. Booth & Edwards, 
supra, at 71; Paul R. Amato & Stacy J. Rogers, A Longitudinal Study of Marital Problems and 
Subsequent Divorce, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 612, 621 (1997). The first comprehensive study 
by Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Differentials in Marital Instability: 1970, 37 AM. SOC. 
REV. 754, 755 (1972), found that the biggest drops in marital instability occurred as the 
woman‟s age of marriage increased from the mid-teens to the late teens (a ten-point drop), and 
that marital stability continued to improve as women‟s age at marriage increased from the late 
teens to the early twenties (five-point drop), and from the early to mid-twenties (three-point 
drop).  
 42.  Matthew D. Bramlett & William D. Mosher, Cohabitation, Divorce, Marriage and 
Remarriage in the United States, 22 VITAL & HEALTH STATS., July 2002, at 1, 55 tbl.21, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf. In a parallel study of 
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This data, which examined the likelihood of divorce for different 
cohorts in 1995, found that the risk of divorce declined from a very high 
rate of 59% within fifteen years for those marrying before the age of 18, 
49% for those marrying at 18 or 19, for those marrying in their early 
twenties, and 35% for those marrying over 25. 
However, a new, more intensive study of marital happiness, using 
more recent data, shows that the age factor has changed.
43
 Instead of 
looking only at divorce, the researchers examined a series of factors, 
including marital happiness, interaction, conflict and “divorce 
proneness.”44 They found, as did the earlier studies, that marriage before 
the age of 20 strongly correlated with increased divorce risk.
45
 Their 
1980 data, like the earlier studies, showed a decline in divorce risk after 
the age of 19, but very little gain as the marriage age increased from 20-
24, 25-29, and 30-34 (though it did show substantial gains in marital 
quality with marriage over the age of 35).
46
 Their data from 2000, 
however, showed a strikingly different pattern. Those who married at 
age 19 or younger continued to be at a much greater risk of divorce than 
those who married later.
47
 But the 2000 data also showed consistent 
gains in marital quality with each increase in age, so that the divorce 
proneness of the group dropped steadily from under the age of 19 to 
over 20, from 20-24 to 25-29, from 25-29 to 30-34, and again over the 
age of 35.
48
 The authors concluded that the “trend for young adults to 
complete their education, become economically secure, find more 
suitable marriage partners, and ensure that they are psychologically 
ready appears to have benefitted contemporary marital relationships.”49 
Together, the decline of the shot gun marriage, the increased 
riskiness of younger marital unions, and the changing economy, which 
has simultaneously increased the rewards for education and eliminated 
                                                                                                                     
cohabitation rates, however, the CDC found that the greatest improvements in stability occurred 
when the woman‟s age at the start of cohabitation was in the over 25 age group, rather than the 
20-24 age group. Id. at 49 tbl.15. In contrast with the marriage figures, the CDC found no 
statistically significant differences between the stability of cohabitation begun in the late teens 
versus the early twenties. Id. The CDC offered no explanation for these results. It is possible 
that the institutional role of marriage is more critical to relationship success in the early 
twenties, but the results may also be explained by differences in the populations who cohabit 
earlier rather than later in life. 
 43.  Id. at 55. 
 44.  PAUL R. AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING 
79 (2009). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. 
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the jobs paying a family wage to less educated young men, have remade 
the relationship between class and family. The transformation is still 
underway for whites, and the rate of change varies by region. Consider, 
for example, the teen birth rate. The lowest overall rates are in the 
Northeast—the wealthiest part of the country and the region most 
unequivocally embracing the blue paradigm.
50
 The highest rates are in 
the South or Southwest, particularly Texas, New Mexico, Mississippi, 
Arizona, and Arkansas.
51
 By the end of the nineties, the rate of change 
had accelerated.
52
 In 1988, for example, the lowest teen birth rates were 
in Minnesota, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Iowa, New Hampshire and 
Vermont.
53
 Since then, rates have dropped more dramatically in New 
England than the upper Midwest, increasing the regional 
concentration.
54
 The five states with the highest rates in 1988 
(Mississippi, New Mexico, Arkansas, Texas and Arizona), in contrast, 
did not change significantly.
55
  
These patterns partially reflect racial composition.
56
 The states with 
low teen birth rates are much less diverse than the states with higher 
teen birth rates.
57
 Looking at white individuals, the states with the 
lowest rates were New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York 
and Rhode Island—still in the Northeast, but concentrated in the 
wealthy mid-Atlantic states and New England.
58
 In contrast, the highest 
white teen birth rates were concentrated in the very conservative, 
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 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 11 tbl.3.3. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
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whites alone diverge most between the core northeastern states and the southern states. See id.  
 57.  For example, Latinos constitute 42% of the population of New Mexico, 32.4% of 
California, 32% of Texas, and 25% of Arizona. Id. at 16 tbl.3.6. Moreover, since the Latino 
population in these states is substantially younger than the white population, and fertility rates 
are higher, the effect on the teen birth rate is substantial. Over half of all births in these states are 
to Latinos. See id. tbl.3.6. 
 58.  Id. 
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traditional, and poorer border and Southern states: Arkansas, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
59
 These states also tend to show 
the greatest commitment to “moral values.”60  
These changing patterns of family formation, which partly reflect 
differences in wealth and the racial and class composition of different 
regions of the country, set up an ideological battle. The new blue 
paradigm, which has been embraced politically in the same states with 
the highest average ages of marriage (the Northeast and the West Coast) 
is deeply offensive to those who adhere to more religious and traditional 
family values. It assumes that sex will occur without marriage. It 
embraces birth control and abortion. It worries more about poverty than 
about the nonmarital births that tend to be associated with poverty. And 
the most visible symbols of the new model—the Hollywood stars 
flaunting their alternative lifestyles—may be a deep affront to those 
who see their communities in danger. The more conservative areas of 
the country are more culturally diverse—the distinctive cultural patterns 
of the South and border states are not the same as those of the mountain 
or plains states. Nonetheless, those with the greatest commitment to 
traditional religious values, who would like to continue to promote the 
unity of sex, marriage, and reproduction, face the greatest challenges to 
continued family stability. 
III. BACKLASH: BRINGING BACK BABY AS THE 
PUNISHMENT FOR FORNICATION 
By the end of the seventies, the U.S. Supreme Court had banished 
the shot gun marriage as official state policy. In Carey v. Population 
Services International,
61
 the case that invalidated the New York law 
restricting distribution of contraceptives to minors, the state asserted 
that it if unmarried teens had ready access to contraception and could 
reliably prevent pregnancy, the result would “lead to increased sexual 
activity among the young.”62 The Court dismissed the suggestion that it 
is appropriate to deter sexual activity by “increasing the hazards 
attendant on it” out of hand, observing that “no court or commentator 
has taken the argument seriously.”63 The Court explained that: “It would 
be plainly unreasonable to assume that the (the State) has prescribed 
pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as . . . punishment for 
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fornication . . . . We remain reluctant to attribute any such „scheme of 
values‟ to the State.”64 With that declaration, the shot gun marriage as 
official state policy was at an end—at least until the next decade 
brought it back.  
The red paradigm has sought to bring marriage back at the federal 
and state levels as the only institution specially designed to unite sex 
and procreation. Thus, the natural law tradition, which has been cited in 
opposition to same-sex marriage, views the unity that comes from the 
distinctive nature of heterosexual sex as central to the definition of 
marriage as an intrinsic good.
65
 Political scientist Hadley Arkes, for 
example, has remarked that “sexuality” refers to that part of our nature 
that has as its end the purpose of begetting.
66
 In comparison, the other 
forms of “sexuality” may be taken as minor burlesques or even 
mockeries of the true thing.
67
 The Institute for American Values, which 
in other respects distances itself from the Christian right, nonetheless 
reasons in its statement on “Marriage and the Law” that: “The vast 
majority of human children are created through acts of passion between 
men and women. Connecting children to their mother and father 
requires a social and legal institution called „marriage‟ with sufficient 
power, weight, and social support to influence the erotic behavior of 
young men and women.”68 
The key to this social conservative agenda is not just marriage 
promotion, which might focus on encouraging childbearing within 
marriage and discouraging divorce. Indeed, such efforts, if effective and 
if voluntarily undertaken, might command widespread support. Instead, 
these efforts emphasize renewing the link between marriage and control 
of sexuality. Doing so requires making sexuality more hazardous. This 
agenda brings together religious teachings about the relationship 
between sex and marriage with a political mission to enlist the state in 
promoting the right values.  
This new political agenda has focused most prominently on the high 
profile issues of same-sex marriage and abortion. Less noted, however, 
have been the efforts to undercut access to contraception. 
Contraception, of course, is too popular and widely available to restrict 
                                                                                                                     
 64.  Id. at 695 (quotation omitted). 
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on a wholesale basis. Instead, such efforts have involved the restriction 
of availability for the most vulnerable, especially teens, the poor, and 
minority women dependent on government subsidized access. The 
principle arenas in the fight are abstinence education, parental 
involvement, restrictions on federal subsidization, and access to new 
techniques such as Plan B, the morning-after pill.  
Dating back to the eighties, for example, have been efforts to 
undercut Title X, the federal program that attempts to discourage teen 
pregnancy through systematic provision of contraceptives.
69
 Senator 
Jesse Helms denounced the program, observing that “no one can deny 
the fact that Title X does indeed subsidize teenage sexual activity. . . . at 
a minimum, Title X tends to create an atmosphere in which teenage 
promiscuity is viewed as normal and acceptable conduct.”70 The Reagan 
administration‟s efforts to require parental involvement, which would 
have effectively deterred teens from setting foot in family planning 
centers, were struck down by the courts,
71
 but cuts in federal funding 
were a factor in the steep rise in teen births in the late eighties and early 
nineties.
72
 
In more recent years, these efforts have focused not just on securing 
parental involvement in teen contraceptive and abortion access, but in 
fighting to turn back the clock on sexual permissiveness more generally. 
In 2008, the Republican Party platform provided that:  
 
We renew our call for replacing “family planning” 
programs for teens with increased funding for abstinence 
education, which teaches abstinence until marriage as the 
responsible and expected standard of behavior. Abstinence 
from sexual activity is the only protection that is 100 
percent effective against out-of-wedlock pregnancies and 
sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS when 
transmitted sexually.
73
 
                                                                                                                     
 69.  See, e.g., Jeannie I. Rosoff & Asta M. Kenney, Title X and Its Critics, 16 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 111 (1984). 
 70.  Id. at 114-15 (reprinting Senator Jesse Helms‟ testimony before the Labor and Human 
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Yet, as we have discussed at length elsewhere, abstinence-only 
education has been ineffective in promoting abstinence until marriage 
and may make it more likely that teens will not use contraception when 
they do have intercourse.
74
 Indeed, preliminary reports suggest that the 
popularity of abstinence only programs may have contributed to the 
recent rise in teen pregnancy.
75
  
In the next section of the Article, we examine the effects of such 
efforts and their impact in exacerbating the relationship between class, 
family and the consequences of sex.  
A. Flunking Sex Ed: Education, Class, and Family in the New 
American Hierarchy 
When we think of the law and fertility, our minds turn to abortion; 
this reflects how central abortion has become to mobilizing family 
values voters. In fact, the efforts to resurrect traditional understandings 
of marriage and family more comprehensively involve abstinence 
education, contraception, sterilization, and infertility. In each of these 
instances, we can see class at work, we can see the privileges that class 
endows, and we can also see how fights over moral values are most 
likely to affect those who are least likely to vote.
76
 Indeed, family 
structure and poverty affect voter turnout, and family structure has 
become a major predictor of voting patterns.
77
  
Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that the measures taken to 
reinforce the messages conservative parents would like to instill in their 
children may have the largest impact on the poor and the vulnerable. 
When it comes to decreases in funding for contraception and abortion, 
the poor have fewer options. 
1. Contraception 
Although virtually all American women will use some form of 
                                                                                                                     
ducation/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 74.  Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W. 
VA. L. REV. 459, 460 (2007). 
 75.  See Kristin A. Moore, Teen Births: Examining the Recent Increase, Research Brief 
(Child Trends, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2009, at 4, available at http://www.childtrends.org/ 
Files/Child_Trends_2009_03_13_FS_TeenBirthRate.pdf. 
 76.  High income voters are most likely to vote, even controlling for education. See Yosef 
Bonaparte, Why Do High Income Families Have Higher Voter Turnout? 13 (JEL, Working 
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contraception during their lifetimes, there remains enormous variation 
in contraceptive use and non-use among sexually active men and 
women. Wealthy and more educated women are more likely to 
consistently use birth control: 19% of wealthier women (above 250% of 
the poverty line) did not use contraceptives for some period during a 
year compared to 29% of women living in poverty; and 15% of college 
graduates, compared to 36% of those with less than a high school 
education, did not use contraceptives during the same period.
78
 Women 
who are uninsured are almost twice as likely as privately insured 
women to go without contraceptives for a period of one year.
79
  
Part of the problem is funding. Medicaid is the primary system that 
funds health care access for poor women, in contrast with the Title X 
family planning program, which provides only about 12% of all funds.
80
 
However, Medicaid is limited to women who are pregnant or who have 
children and receive public welfare through Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF).
81
 When Medicaid expanded eligibility to a 
group of women whose Medicaid benefits were due to expire and to 
some women of higher income (but still relatively low income women), 
greater contraceptive use produced a 4% decline in the birth rate of 
teens, and a 2% decline in the birth rate of women over the age of 19.
82
 
2. Abortion 
Let us turn next to abortion, something we think of in terms of the 
culture wars, but not necessarily in terms of class. Abortion has, 
however, always been a class issue. In the time before Roe v. Wade, 
when abortions were illegal in most states, wealthier women were better 
able to obtain abortions.
83
 They could travel to jurisdictions (like New 
York or England) that had legalized abortion, and they could obtain 
exceptions from stringent laws.
84
 For example, in 1972, the year before 
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the Court decided Roe, more than 100,000 women traveled to New 
York State, where abortion was legal; 50,000 of these women traveled 
farther than 500 miles.
85
  
Today, quite ironically, poor women are more likely to get an 
abortion than are wealthier women. The role of abortion in determining 
the life chances of some women is, however, a critical concern for the 
poor, minorities, those who have less control over their sexuality (a big 
predictor of divorce as well), and those from abusive and dysfuntional 
families. When New York Times reported in early 2009 that abortion 
was “safe, legal, and inexpensive,” the directors of the Abortion Access 
Project and the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health wrote 
in to protest that “An abortion at 10 weeks‟ gestation costs $523 on 
average, often out of pocket. To term this “inexpensive,” especially in 
the current economy, is ludicrous.”86  
For poor women, the tradeoffs between access to contraception, 
abortion, and unintended births are acute. The Guttmacher Institute 
reports, for example, that at the turn of the century the “unintended 
pregnancy rate rose 29% among women living below the poverty level 
and 26% among women living between 100% and 200% of the poverty 
level, but fell 20% among more affluent women.”87 These increases 
reflect access and use of contraception. Unintended pregnancy rates also 
rose for high school dropouts, and women between the ages of nineteen 
and twenty-four, while declining for adolescents and college 
graduates.
88
 Unintended pregnancy rates influence the incidence of 
abortion, and abortion rates are predictably higher for those with higher 
unintended pregnancy rates.
89
 Thus, poor women, who constituted 30% 
of all women of reproductive age in the United States in 2000, obtained 
57% of the abortions.
90
 Unsurprisingly, these patterns also correlate 
with race. White women, who had lower pregnancy rates, ended only 
18% of conceptions with abortion.
91
 African Americans, who had 
higher pregnancy rates, ended 43% of conceptions with abortion.
92
 
Hispanics terminated pregnancies 25% of the time.
93
  
Even when they are able to obtain abortions, two-thirds of poor 
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women report that they would have liked to have undergone the 
procedure at an earlier stage of the pregnancy.
94
 As a result, access to 
abortion is more critical to reproductive choice for poorer women and 
women of color. Rebekah Smith emphasizes that while overall abortion 
rates were declining in the nineties, the “abortion rate among poor 
women increased substantially . . . . Increasingly, women obtaining 
abortions were never-married, low-income, non-white or Hispanic, and 
usually the parent of at least one child.”95  
Medicaid provides no funding for abortion except, according to the 
1977 Hyde Amendment, in cases of rape, incest, or life endangerment to 
the mother.
96
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld restrictions on 
poor women‟s ability to obtain abortions, first deciding in 1977 that a 
state need not pay for medically necessary abortions, and then 
upholding the Hyde Amendment three years later.
97
 The consequence is 
that the 40% of poor women who are covered by Medicaid do not 
receive federal funding if they need an abortion. Somewhere between 
one-fifth to one-third of women on Medicaid who wanted an abortion 
could not afford to obtain one.
98
 Some of these women are, however, 
luckier than others if they live in one of the seventeen states that covers 
medically necessary abortions with state funds: four of those states—
Hawaii, Maryland, New York, and Washington—do so voluntarily, 
while the rest are under court order to do so.
99
  
Abortion is more likely to affect the birth rates of nonwhite women 
and, because these unintended pregnancies overwhelmingly occur to 
unmarried women, the nonmarital birth rate. Three economists found 
that states legalizing abortion experienced a 4% decline in births 
relative to other states.
100
 The decline among teens, women over 35, and 
nonwhite women was even greater: 13%, 8%, and 12% respectively.
101
 
Out-of-wedlock births declined by twice as much as births in 
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wedlock.
102
  
Nearly half of all pregnancies in the United States are unintended, 
including 40% of those among white women, 69% among blacks, and 
54% among Latinas.
103
 The disparities in abortion rates underscore the 
differential racial and class patterns. “Poor women constituted 30% of 
all women of reproductive age in the United States, yet they obtained 
57% of the abortions in 2000.”104  
B. Cynical Manipulation 
As an example of the attack on controlling reproduction, consider 
the history of the Food and Drug Administration‟s approval of Plan B. 
The Food and Drug Administration‟s consideration of Plan B, 
emergency contraception, provides an example of how politics at the 
national level can affect access to reproductive rights. The Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approved Plan B, or levonorgestrel pills, 
“the morning-after pill,” as a prescription drug in 1999.105 For 
maximum effectiveness, the pills must be taken within seventy-two 
hours of unprotected intercourse because they are designed to interfere 
to prevent ovulation, and may affect the processes leading up to 
implantation.
106
 According to the manufacturer, they will not affect an 
existing pregnancy; that is, they will not affect a pregnancy after the 
embryo has become implanted in the uterine wall.
107
 Plan B, which is 
also called emergency contraception, differs from RU-486 in that the 
latter can dislodge an existing pregnancy even after implantation, and 
can be effective within forty-nine days after the beginning of the 
woman‟s last period.  
In April 2003, the company that manufactured Plan B (now Barr 
Pharmaceuticals) filed an application to make the drug available without 
a prescription.
108
 Later that year, two FDA advisory committees voted 
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(23-4) to approve the application, without any limitation on the age of 
the recipient, and relevant FDA staff indicated their support.
109
 
Nonetheless, the FDA issued a statement of non-approval, explaining 
that it was concerned about the safety of Plan B for women under the 
age of 16.
110
 Barr filed a second application in July 2004, asking that the 
drug be approved without a prescription for girls and women age 16 or 
older.
111
 Almost two years later, the FDA finally approved the over-the-
counter availability of Plan B, but only for women 18 years or older.
112
 
Minors need a prescription to obtain the drug.
113
 The FDA based this 
restriction on a lack of adequate data concerning the safety of Plan B for 
minors—even though numerous medical groups, including the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, supported its availability.
114
 
The background story is far more interesting. During the first phase 
of the FDA‟s deliberations, when it was considering the initial 
application, several employees of the FDA testified in depositions that 
they were told that rejecting Plan B was a political necessity.
115
 New 
York Times reported that  
 
John Jenkins, director of “the agency‟s office of new drugs, 
said in a deposition that his boss, Dr. Steven Galson, told 
him “that he felt he didn‟t have a choice” but to reject the 
application . . . . “And he characterized that in a sense that 
he wasn‟t sure that he would be allowed to remain as center 
director if he didn‟t agree with the action,” Dr. Jenkins 
said. . . . Dr. Florence Houn, director of the office that 
evaluated the Plan B application, said that she was told by 
Dr. Janet Woodcock, a deputy F.D.A. commissioner, that a 
rejection was necessary “to appease the administration‟s 
constituents, and then later this could be approved.”116  
 
Indeed, an internal memo of the FDA expressed the concern of Janet 
Woodcock, the deputy operations commissioner, that “we could not 
anticipate or prevent extreme promiscuous behaviors such as the 
medication taking on an „Urban Legend‟ status that would lead 
                                                                                                                     
Exceeding Statutory Authority, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 369, 369 (2008). 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. at 372-73. 
111.  Id. at 375. 
112.  Id. at 369-70. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. at 389-90. 
115.  Gardiner Harris, “Morning After” Pill Is Cleared for Wider Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
24, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/24/health/24cnd-pill.html. 
116.  Id. 
2009] FAMILY CLASSES: RETHINKING CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE 381 
 
 
adolescents to form sex-based cults centered around the use of Plan 
B.”117  
When the Government Accounting Office subsequently investigated 
the FDA‟s procedures in considering the drug, it found that the FDA 
had not followed its usual procedures for approval of new drugs.
118
 
High-level management at the FDA was much more involved in the 
Plan B application than in comparable applications concerning over-the-
counter status.
119
 Moreover, the rationale for the non-approval—that 
data on older adolescents could not be applied to younger adolescents 
and that over-the-counter status of Plan B might have an effect “on the 
propensity for younger adolescents to engage in unsafe sexual behaviors 
because of their lack of cognitive maturity”—simply “did not follow 
FDA‟s traditional practices.”120 Instead, the FDA had previously relied 
on data for older adolescents in deciding on a drug‟s safety for younger 
adolescents, and the agency had not previously “considered behavioral 
implications due to differences in cognitive development.”121 Indeed, in 
a subsequent lawsuit about the FDA‟s actions, a federal court found that 
there was “a strong preliminary showing of „bad faith or improper 
behavior‟” on the part of the FDA.122  
During the second phase, while the FDA was considering the 
amended application, Susan Wood, who was the Director of the Office 
of Women‟s Health at the FDA, resigned in frustration.123 She told Ted 
Koppel on Nightline that she quit because she “felt that science was 
being overruled at [the] FDA and women‟s health was being 
damaged.”124 A few months later, Dr. Frank Davidoff, a former editor-
in chief of the Annals of Internal Medicine, resigned as a member of an 
FDA advisory committee, explaining that he could “no longer associate 
myself with an organization that is capable of making such as important 
decision so flagrantly on the basis of political influence.”125 
Additionally, in March, 2009, a federal judge found that the FDA had 
inappropriately appointed people holding anti-abortion views to an 
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expert panel convened to review the drug.
126
 
So what was behind all of this political maneuvering? Plan B is 
controversial for two reasons. First, some maintain that Plan B causes 
abortions. The drug, which contains a large dose of the same hormones 
used in the birth control pill, is primarily designed to prevent ovulation, 
and animal studies indicate that it does not block implantation of a 
fertilized egg.
127
 Nonetheless, the manufacturer cannot rule out the 
possibility that it will make it less likely that a fertilized egg will 
implant in the uterine wall. Those who believe that life begins at 
conception therefore maintain that any drug that lessens the likelihood 
of implantation is abortion-inducing and, one complainant alleged that 
Plan B caused an abortion.
128
 Linking Plan B to abortion, given the 
intensity of views on the issue, guarantees substantial opposition. 
Nonetheless, were the only issue presented by Plan B the possibility of 
interfering with implantation, we suspect the drug would not have been 
so controversial. The second objection, however, was that the greater 
availability of something that could be taken the “morning after” 
intercourse would encourage improvident behavior.
129
  As one witness 
testified at hearings held in December 2003 on the drug, “It is self-
evident that over-the-counter availability of the morning after pill will lead 
to increased promiscuity and its attendant physical and psychological 
damage.”130 The Concerned Women for America alleged that it would 
result in an “increase in the already too high STD [sexually transmitted 
diseases] rates by encouraging risky sexual activity, and be given by 
statutory rapists to adolescents to cover up the continuing abuse.”131 The 
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops alleged that improved access to 
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contraception does not decrease the number of unwanted pregnancies.
132
 
It was concerned that mandating insurance coverage of contraceptives 
for minors would subvert parental rights over their children.
133
 
Those advocating for the wider availability of Plan B argued that 
emergency contraception could provide significant help in reducing the 
number of unplanned teen pregnancies and abortions.
134
 In their 
testimony supporting the availability of Plan B, the National Partnership 
for Women and Families pointed out that about one-half of the 
unplanned pregnancies in the United States each year resulted from 
contraceptive failure, and that women could be trusted to use Plan B 
responsibly.
135
 While existing testing has not yet established whether 
widespread use of Plan B will reduce the pregnancy rate, the initial 
testing suggests that it does not affect the rate of unprotected sex, and 
ease of access makes women more likely to use it.
136
 
FDA regulations, of course, determine the availability of emergency 
contraception for the entire country. In addition, different states 
determine how it will be distributed. More than half of all states require 
that if private insurance policies cover prescription drugs, then they 
must also cover all FDA-approved contraceptives, including emergency 
contraception. Most other states provide for general coverage except for 
certain insurance plans and employers; indeed, only two states (North 
Carolina and Arkansas) explicitly exclude emergency contraceptives 
from this mandate.
137
 Nonetheless, in other states, Plan B may be 
excluded from Medicaid coverage. By contrast, in 15 states, emergency 
rooms are required to provide information about emergency 
contraceptives, and, in more than 2/3 of these states, emergency rooms 
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can dispense Plan B upon the request of a sexual assault victim.
138
 The 
arguments that Plan B will affect sexual behavior, though not 
implausible, are not fundamentally different from those about 
contraception more generally. It is certainly true that the widespread 
availability of reliable forms of contraception such as the pill have had 
an impact on sexual practices, and particularly on the acceptability of 
nonmarital intercourse. Nonetheless, with the change in mores 
established without the availability of Plan B, the greater availability of 
emergency contraception is unlikely to have much impact on overall 
sexual behavior. Its primary effect is likely to be in preventing 
pregnancy in cases of contraceptive failure.    
IV. CONCLUSION 
Policies that protect the availability of contraceptive choice are 
critical as we move forward;
139
 the highest rates of unwanted 
pregnancies and abortions and lowest rates of contraceptive use are 
correlated with income. We must rebuild the emphasis on contraception, 
and move away from a focus on abortion as we consider how, in 
Professor Weyrauch‟s words, we can pay attention to the “implications 
of social class . . . on how to regulate the consequences of sexual 
conduct.”140 
The following three issues will be critical to rethinking contraceptive 
policies for the nation as a whole: 
1. Comprehensive sex education. Comprehensive sex education 
includes arguments for abstinence alongside of medically accurate 
information about contraception. Abstinence-only efforts: a) have been 
less effective in reducing pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases 
than comprehensive efforts; and, b) increase regional, class, and racial 
inequalities as the poorest Americans, who are the most likely to lack 
access to other sources of information, are also the most likely to be 
enrolled in abstinence only programs, whatever their preferences may 
be. We emphasize that the issue is not whether the values underlying 
abstinence should be taught; it is whether they should be taught to the 
exclusion of other views.  
2. Comprehensive access to contraception. For adults, contraceptive 
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access is largely a matter of funding and convenience—and choice. The 
most reliable methods are long acting ones such as sterilization, IUDs, 
and hormonal implants. These methods, unlike lower tech devices such 
as condoms, can be expensive and require access to a doctor and the 
ability to fill prescriptions. Accordingly, the reliability of contraceptive 
use corresponds to access to health care.
141
 
3. Adolescent access. The much more divisive issue with respect to 
contraception is teen access, particularly without parental consent. 
Although the Supreme Court decision guaranteeing contraceptive access 
to teens remains good law, a number of states have taken measures that 
undercut ready access (e.g., requirements that they must be married, or 
that a physician must certify the necessity). 
The issue of adolescent access is a critical one because teen 
pregnancy has more negative consequences on mothers and children, 
and because parental consent requirements overwhelmingly result in 
less teen contraceptive use. On the other hand, the issue of parental 
authority touches a responsive chord in many parts of the population. 
Like other family planning issues, this is controversial, with numerous 
interests to balance; overall, it seems critical to ensure that all teens, 
regardless of income, have what they need to prevent unwanted 
childbirth. 
Reproductive autonomy is most readily available for the affluent and 
the sophisticated, and is increasingly beyond the reach of the most 
vulnerable. Family planning efforts of all kinds have been the biggest 
casualty of the cynical manipulation of ideological politics, and are a 
critical arena for national policy.  
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